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It used to be that a good physician
could assimilate, retain, and recall
most of the known facts about medicine. Beginning with the years prior
to World War II, it became evident
this was no longer possible. The systemizations to condense facts in other
fields had not progressed as far as had
the accumulation of facts in medicine.
Thus, we have seen the emergence of
the "medical specialist" and the "team
approach" to disease. Even this multiple physician approach is beginning
to fail before the exponentially increasing array of information about
pathological processes.
I believe that there are just three
things that can be done about this
overwhelming wealth of information:
(1) We can develop more specialists
that are even more specialized, but already this approach is being hampered
by problems of communication. (2)
We can develop more encompassing
theories of disease so as to reduce the
large number of facts to a relatively
few simple hypotheses. This is the
goal of the model builders, perhaps
the ideal approach, but we cannot afford to wait for this nirvana. And
even if this were possible now we
would only reach a temporary plateau
upon which new mountains of data
would pile. (3) The third approach is
to utilize such mechanical and electronic slaves as are available to help
us organize, retain, recall, and communicate those observations on disease worthy of record. I believe we
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are forced to develop this third approach while evolving the best compromise for the first approach and
pursuing the second with all possible
vigor.
In order to utilize the latest engineering achievements we must be very
clear about what instructions we give.
If we are not, we may find ourselves
in the position of the "sorcerer's apprentice" who failed to learn how to
turn off the water; only here we will
have stacks and stacks of meaningless
paper.
It is sensible to examine first how
the human computer works when
making medical diagnoses (or any
kind of inductive or scientific inference) by discussing hypotheses which
have attempted to describe this process. The machinery should be taught
how to imitate the human diagnostician. Perhaps then we can find ways
to improve processes when coupling
the machine and human brain.
The concepts to be presented here
have been discussed before in connection with medical diagnosis by a number of authors. I draw attention particularly to the papers by Neyman
(1947, 1950), Yerushalmy (1947),
Chiang (1951), Chiang, Hodges, and
Yerushalmy (1955), Paycha (1958),
Arnois, Silverman, and Turner (1959),
Ledley and Lusted (1959, 1960),
Shephard and Turner (1959), Tanimoto (1960), Cady et al. (1961), Van
Woerkom and Brodman (1961), Ward
and Hook (1962), Entwisle and Entwisle (1963), Collen et al. (1964),
and Nissen-Meyer (1964).
The discussion is divided into two
sections. The first section deals with
the problem of construction of a
scheme of classification of disease entities. This may be termed the problem
of classification. The second section
deals with the credibility of a diagnosis after a patient has been assigned
to a disease entity. The degree of credence attached to possible assignments
may be used as the basis of assignment, and hence the basis of medical
diagnosis itself. I will term this the
problem of credence.
The Problem of Classification
It is convenient to refer to the
state of a patient at a particular instant of time. Let us suppose that at
some such instant a patient (or normal individual) may be completely

characterized by the concomitant values of a sufficiently large number of
variables. Some of these variables,
such as sex, are constant throughout
life; some, such as height and weight,
change relatively slowly. Others, such
as blood cholesterol, vary dramatically
at different times. Some are nearly
constant because of feedback control
mechanisms. Some are periodic. Some
strikingly reflect impacts from the environment. Some are random. Many
are interrelated in complex fashions,
and their nature is sought by the
model builders. Whatever are the
characteristics of the various variables,
however, the set of values applying to
a sufficiently large collection of variables uniquely characterizes the state
of the individual at the particular
point in time. It may be helpful to
think in geometric terms. Suppose
each variable is the axis of a geometrical space. If there are n variables
there will be n axes for our space, and
we will have an n-dimensional space.
(It will not harm our concept to visualize a two-dimensional space with,
for example, the first axis, X1 , equal
to the weight of the individual, and
the second axis, X2 , equal to the systolic blood pressure of the individual.)
Now, at a particular instant of time,
the set of values for the n variables
will determine a single point in the
state space. This single point will be
called the state point of the individual
at the particular instant. It is easy to
visualize that in an instant the point
can shift slightly from its original
position. So, through life, from the
moment of birth (or earlier) to the
moment of death, the individual will
be uniquely described by a succession
of adjacent state points. Imagining
these points strung together we have
a line of state points twisting and
bending through the state space from
birth to death. This is indeed an abstract view of a patient, as a line in
state space, a life line. One may immediately object to this "coldy mechanized" view. However, there is no
reason in principle why some of the
n variables cannot represent the emotional and affective states of the individual at each instant. Theoretically,
every human experience and feeling
can be represented as values on the
axes, or on combinations of the axes,
in the state space.
Suppose there is a line in state space
for every person in the world, a

bundle of more than three billion lines!
As the course of life is somewhat similar for all of us, the life lines will
have parallel tendencies although no
two lines will be identical (possible but
improbable). Typical individuals will
lie toward the center of the bundle,
atypical ones toward the outside.
Clearly, life lines will not exist in all
parts of the state space. The dictates
of life are such that the living mechanism will not function in all possible
states. Thus, very extreme life lines
will not exist. Possible but still extreme life lines will occur rarely,
whereas mild, atypical lines will occur
much more frequently in this conception. (This central tendency of the life
lines is predicted by the "central limit
theorems" of mathematical probability, and is confirmed by common experience; the mathematical function
most used to describe the density of
lines at various distances from the
center of the bundle is termed the normal or Gaussian distribution.)
Some of the lines may represent
lives which at times have more than
negligible malfunction. Then the individual is diseased. Satellite bundles of
diseased life lines occur with new
centers of density. If it is clear (sufficiently low density of lines between
regions of high density) that these satellite clusters are not fortuitous irregularities in the tail of the normal density,
then the satellites themselves are recognized as distinct disease entities and
are appropriately named. Sometimes
partial tails of the normal density
function are taken to be disease entities (although not distinct) when the
respective states represent some degree
of malfunction or pathology. It is useful to distinguish these two patterns of
disease.
In the past, recognition of disease
pattern has been largely heuristic.
Now, powerful quantitative tools exist
for aiding this process. Of particular
interest is the generalized measure of
distance (squared) between cluster
centers, due to Mahalanobis (1930,
1936) and known as Mahalanobis'
D 2 • The central idea in the use of D 2
is the measure of the distance (squared)
between cluster centers, taking into
account the functional dependencies
between state variables. If the distance
between centers is large, compared to
the scatter about the centers, then
distinct disease entities are recognized.
Statistical tests of significance help to
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distinguish real from accidental clustering. The method of "discriminant
functions," due to Fisher (1938), and
the "generalized T' test," due to Hotelling (1931), are mathematically equivalent procedures to D 2 • These and some
other procedures with similar objectives are frequently referred to as
"cluster analysis." An over-all view
of the rationale, mathematical derivation, and uses of these procedures is
found in Rao (1952). The elementary
discussions in Shephard and Turner
(1959) and Hanna, Turner, and
Hughes (1963) may be helpful.
Measurements of distances between
cluster centers may be made for various fixed ages yielding a "distance
function" of age. Alternatively, adjustments of the states for age may be
made by replacing observed states
with corresponding (sliding up or down
the average life line) states at some
age. The principles of "covariance
analysis" are appropriate here.
There is one final consideration
about choice of procedures for cluster
analysis before we pass on to the problem of credence. The D 2-T' discriminant function procedure is based upon
one rather restrictive assumption about
the equality of scatter, and interdependencies between variables, about
two centers which we wish to measure
the distance between. This assumption
often is not even approximately true
when comparing normal and diseased
life line bundles. In this case, generalized procedures are available (Kendall,
1957), although they have not been
used widely.
The Problem of Credence

Suppose we have divided the state
space into a set of not necessarily
mutually exclusive regions recognized
as disease entities plus the "normal"
region. It is immaterial whether informal or formal procedures were used
in arriving at the regions. We will take
the regions to be fixed for purposes
of application of the ideas of this
section. Let us realize, however, that
these regions will be rearranged at
times as information about the state
space accumulates. Further suppose
that a physician has observations corresponding to the values of some of
the state variables. At this point he arrives at a provisional diagnosis (i.e.,
he assigns the "patient" to one of the
regions in state space). But this diagnosis suffers from uncertainty due to
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at least two causes: (1) his information
is incomplete as he cannot measure
all state variables, and (2) those measurements he has (signs, symptoms,
tests, etc.) contain intrinsic errors of
a random or systematic nature, due
either to physiological variation or to
measurement error. The physician now
decides whether to take more measurements (new measurements or replications of old ones), to begin treatment
based on his provisional diagnosis, or
both. His behavior in these two important respects is predicated largely
upon his belief in his own diagnosis.
Thus there is the problem of how best
to measure and reason about the subjective phenomenon, credibility.
We will relate credibility to probability by first examining some concepts
of probability. The notion of mathematical probability first arose in the
Italian Renaissance as a theory of repetitive happenings which was applied
to games of chance and even to life
insurance. The philosophical and
mathematical bases of the theory of
probability were subject to much dispute until the purely mathematical aspe.cts of the theory were abstracted
(cf. Kolmogorov, 1956). In this modern guise the essential ideas of the
theory of probability can be simply
stated. We consider the set of possible
results of an experiment. Call these
results Ai, A., · · ·, Ak. Suppose B
is another kind of result of the same
experiment. We will let A ,B stand
for the event, "both A , and B happen."
We will let Ai U B stand for the event,
"either A, or B, or both A, and B
happen." We will let S stand for the
event which must happen, and 0 stand
for the event which cannot happen.
Then if we write A,A. = 0 we imply
that both Ai and A. cannot both happen. Or if we write Ai U B = S we
imply that either A, or B must happen.
Now the theory of probability concerns
certain real numbers which are assigned to each possible experimental
result and are called "probabilities."
Thus; we wi\l write p(A,) and read,
"the probability that Ai happens," or
write p(A ,
B) and read "the probability that either A, or B happens," and
so forth. It is important to realize that
the theory of probability itself does
rtot provide prescriptions for assigning the probabilities. These prescriptions must be obtained from other
considerations. However, the probabilities must satisfy three restrictions

(called the axioms of probability): (1)
p(A ,) ~ 0 where A , is any result, (2)
p(S)
1, and (3) if AiA2
0 then
p(A, U A .) = p(A ,)
p(A2). This is

=

+

=

all we need to establish from the theorems of the theory of probability. For
example, we can derive that p(O) = 0,
that 0 ;:;:; p(A ,) ;:;:; 1, that p(A , U B) =
p(A ,) + p(B) - p(A ,B), and many
more. Before proceeding we will need
to make one further definition. Let
p(BI A,) = p(A iB)I p(A,) and read p(B I
Ai) as "the probability that B will happen given that A i has already happened," or "the probability of B given
A , ," for short. Then we say that A ,
and B are independent if p(B A,) =
p(B). If B and A, are independent then
we see that p(A ,B) = p(A,)p(B), the
famous rule of multiplication for independent events.
It would be easy to demonstrate
the truth of a very remarkable formula discovered by Thomas Bayes
(1763) and now known as Bayes'
Theorem. This formula can be written:

I

I A,) / p(B).
where p(B) = p(A,)p(B I A ,) + p(A2)
p(B I A ,) + · · · p(Ak)p(B I A k), and
p(A ,

I B)

p(A,)p(B

supposing that A,, A,, · · ·, Ak are
mutually exclusive events.
Probabilities have to do with the
frequency of occurrence of possible
outcomes of an experiment. Let us put
aside all thoughts about probabilities
and think about a set of possible hypotheses, H i , H. , · · ·, H • , to explain
some observed phenomenon. Suppose
we would like to measure the credence
we place in each hypothesis. What
restrictions should we impose upon
our measure? It has been suggested
(cf. Polya, 1954) that rational humans
behave as though their credences (write
C(Hi), C(H2), etc., for real measures)
obeyed the following three restrictions:
(1) C(H,) ~ 0 where H , is any hypothesis, (2) C(S) = 1 where S = H, U
H, U · · · U H., and (3) if H,H 2 = 0
then C(H, U H2) = C(H,) + C(H2). Restriction (1) says that the measure of
credibility which we will use is never
negative. Restriction (2) says that the
credence in at least one hypothesis is
assigned the numerical quantity one.
Finally, restriction (3) says that if two
hypotheses cannot both be right then
the degree of credence to be placed
upon the compound hypothesis "either
H, or H 2" is simply the sum of the
respective individual credences.

The theory of credibility is identical
in mathematical content to the theory
of probability, although the purposes
of the two theories are quite different.
But since they are mathematically
equivalent, any theorem of probability
can be taken over for credence theory,
and in fact, there is no logical reason
why we cannot mix probabilities and
credences in any valid formula derived from the axioms of probability.
For example, the following mixed
version of Bayes' Theorem is perfectly
valid:
C (H,

IB )

= C (H, )p (B I H i)/p (B ).

This formula may be interpreted to
say that if one wants to calculate the
credence to be placed in hypothesis
number 1, given the observations B ,
then we need to know two things: (1)
the credence placed in hypothesis number 1 before B was observed, and (2)
the probability that B would be observed if hypothesis number 1 were
true. Having similar information for
all alternative hypotheses will allow
computation of the denominator. This
is a remarkable result because it provides a complete solution to the problem of assigning credences to various
hypotheses or diagnoses in light of
any given observations.
The key to using the mixed version
of Bayes' Theorem for measuring or
comparing credence in alternative diagnoses is in the source of the prior
credences, C(H,), C(H2), etc. We consider four different situations.
1. Prior credences estimated as relative frequencies of disease entity in a
particular population. Sometimes it is
possible to estimate how often each
disease entity occurs in a population
from which a current patient was
drawn at random. Such relative frequencies then may be used as proper
measures of the prior credence.
2. Prior credences locally uniform.
The posterior credence, C(H, [ B) will
not be much affected by C(H,), the
prior credence, if there is sufficient
information in the observations B . This
situation can be ensured by increasing
the quality and quantity of the observations (more examinations, tests,
etc.).
3. Prior credences subjective. The
physician may not have formal information of the type encountered in situation 1 but may have strong, intuitively developed measures of prior
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credence based upon experience. Numerical evaluation of these credences
can be evoked but can lead to dangerous conclusions. Polya (1954) and
others warn against attempting it; however, there is no doubt that all practicing physicians act as though they were
making such an evaluation.
4. Minimax prior credences. Consider just two competing diagnoses, H,
and H 2 . Suppose the physician would
take a certain action if the patient had
disease entity number 1 and another
action if the patient had disease entity
number 2. What would be the loss to
the patient if the wrong action were
taken? We can choose prior credences
so that we minimize the maximum loss
to the patient. This approach necessitates very strong observational information before the physician will
depart from the "conservative action."
The idea applies as well to more than
two possible diagnoses.
Most of the current attempts to use
Bayes' Theorem with electronic computers to aid in making medical diagnoses involve situation 1 or 2. Thus,
by situation 1 we replace C(H,), C(H2),
etc. by observed relative frequencies
of the respective disease entities, or by
situation 2 we set the prior credences
equal to each other; that is, C(H,)
C(H,) = · · · = C(H") = 1/k. In either
case we still need to know the second
factors in the mixed Bayes' Theorem,
namely p(B [ H ,), p(B [ H,), etc. We
recall that these factors represent the
probabilities of observing the set of
signs, symptoms, and tests, given that
a particular diagnosis is correct. In
current applications these usually are
empirically determined from the same
population as are the prior credences
of situation 1. That is, these probabilities are replaced by the relative
frequencies of particular sign, symptom, and test configurations in the
various diagnostic cluster groups.
Let us suppose we wish to compare
two competing diagnoses. Let us form
the ratio of p(B [ H,) to p(B [ H,).
When B has been observed, this ratio is
termed the likelihood ratio (LR). By
rearranging Bayes' Theorem we have:

=

LR

=

p(B I Hi) /p(B I H,)

C(H, I B) / C (H,)
C(H2 [ B) / C (H 2)
We then see that the likelihood ratio
amounts to a comparison of the pos26

terior-to-prior credence ratios for the
two diagnoses. If this LR is large we
might wish to favor H , , or if it is small
we might wish to favor H , . The LR
is the basis for the discriminant function techniques mentioned in the last
section, and is the principal idea underlying the procedures adopted in medical diagnosis by Neyman (1947, 1950)
and Collen et al. (1964).
Alternatively, one could employ directly the posterior credence ratio
(CR) given by
CR

=

C (H , I B )/ C (H2 [ B )

That is, if CR is large we would favor
H , , but if CR is small we would
favor H2 . In order to compute CR we
need to specify the prior credences as
well as the likelihoods. This can be
done by appeal to any one of the four
situations enumerated. In particular,
situation 1 has been considered. In
the case of situation 2, the LR = CR
and this has often been used to justify
the LR method.
Conclusions
Armed with an overwhelming accumulation of data about disease, how
can we ensure that they will all be
employed effectively to make a correct
diagnosis in a particular patient? The
use of electronic computers can be
of some help in the collation, correlation, storage, and communication of
the accumulated information, but we
must be careful in instructing the machinery so we will not one day find
a monster whose behavior is unpredictable. A reasonable procedure
would be to analyse our own thought
processes carefully to ascertain how
the human diagnostician arrives at his
conclusions. The matter is certainly
not settled but the concepts of state
spaces and the theory of credences
seem to form a plausible "first model"
of the human inference maker at work
making medical diagnoses. It is hoped
that a wider appreciation of these
ideas will lead to the construction of
better models that could enable the
great potential of the "computer age"
to have its full impact upon medical
care.
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" ... What then is a good experiment? It is that which informs us
of something besides an isolated
fact; it is that which enables us to
foresee , that is, that which enables
us to generalize.
"For without generalization foreknowledge is impossible. The circumstances under which one has
worked will never reproduce themselves all at once. The observed
action then will never recur; the
only thing that can be affirmed is
that under analogous circumstances
an analogous action will be produced. In order to foresee, then, it
is necessary to invoke at least
analogy, that is to say, already
then to generalize ....
" ... Thus, thanks to generalization, each fact observed enables us
to foresee a great many others;
only we must not forget that the
first alone is certain, that all others
are merely probable. No matter
how solidly founded a prediction
may appear to us, we are never
absolutely sure that experiment will
not contradict it, if we undertake
to verify it. The probability, however, is often so great that practically we may be content with it.
It is far better to foresee even without certainty than not to foresee
at all."
Henri Poincare, transl. by
G. B. Halsted. The Foundations of Science Lancaster,
Pennsylvania: The Science
Press, 1946, pp. 128-129.
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